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Disciplinary Rule 2-110(A)(3): Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment, bans use of nonrefundable retainer agreements
The importance of the attorney's role in society has led the
legal profession to self-impose the highest standards of ethical
conduct.' To maintain these standards, New York, as well as
many other states, has adopted a Code of Professional Responsi-
bility (the "Code") to provide lawyers with ethical guidance and to
establish a system of disciplinary proceedings to regulate con-
duct.2 Standards regarding attorneys fees are naturally among
1 See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT (1992) [hereinafter MODEL
RULEs]. The self-governance of the legal profession, for the most part, is a result of the
uniqueness of the close relationship between the profession and the processes of gov-
ernment and law enforcement. Id. pmbl. para. 9. The legal professions relative au-
tonomy carries with it the special responsibility to "assure that its regulations are
conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested
concerns of the bar."Id. para. 11; see Robert P. Lawry, The Central Tradition of Lawy-
ering, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 311 (1990) (articulating key elements of moral tradition of
lawyering as they have evolved in course of changing social, economic, political, and
moral forces); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of
the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958) (noting that role of lawyer in legal
system "imposes on him a trusteeship for the integrity of those fundamental processes
of government and self-government upon which the successful functioning of our soci-
ety depends"). The vital role of lawyers in the preservation of society is recognized by
the American Bar Association when it described a lawyer as a "representative of cli-
ents [as advisor, negotiator and mediary], an officer of the legal system and a public
citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." See MODEL RULES,
supra, pmbl.
2 See N.Y.S.B-A CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmBIrr (McKinney 1992). "The
Code... points the way to the aspiring [attorney] and provides standards by which to
judge the transgressor." Id. pmbl. at 354. The Code was first promulgated by the
American Bar Association in 1969 as its own code of ethics and was adopted by the
New York State Bar Association in 1970 as its official code of ethics. See N.Y. JuD.
LAw app. at 350 (McKinney 1992). In 1983 the American Bar Association adopted the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to serve as a national framework for implemen-
tation of standards of professional conduct. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
Governmental adoption or at least formal declaration by a court are prerequisites for
the provisions of the Model Rules or the Model Code to have authority. See ANDREw L.
KAUFmN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmUrY 18 (3d ed. 1989). Although the
Model Rules were never formally adopted by the New York State Bar Association,
they served as the basis for major revisions in the 1970 Code. See N.Y. JuD. LAw app.
at 350 (McKinney 1992). These revisions were ultimately adopted by the four judicial
departments of the Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court and promulgated
as joint rules of the Appellate Divisions effective September 1, 1990. See id. The disci-
plinary committees of the appellate divisions are responsible for the supervision of
attorney conduct and the establishment of standards by which to review such con-
duct. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 90(2) (McKinney 1983); see also New York State Bar Associa-
tion: Preliminary Report of the Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, 55
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the Code's provisions.3 The validity and fairness of nonrefundable
fee agreements have been a source of continuing controversy, re-
sulting in disagreement among bar associations as to whether
they are ethical.4 The Code's Disciplinary Rules mandate "the
minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action."5 More specifically, Discipli-
N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1983, at 40-42 (outlining reasons disciplinary matters are handled
by appellate divisions instead of Court of Appeals). New York State is the only juris-
diction in the country that vests exclusive responsibility for administering lawyer dis-
cipline in the intermediate appellate court rather than its court of final jurisdiction.
See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 90(2) (McKinney 1983); see also Grunberg v. Feller, 132 Misc. 2d
738, 741, 505 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1986) (holding that dis-
ciplinary committees of appellate divisions are proper forums for complaints involving
attorney misconduct).
3 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 993, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 1284, 499
N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1985) (citations omitted) ("[Als a matter of public policy, courts pay
particular attention to fee arrangements between attorneys and their clients. An at-
torney has the burden of showing that a fee contract is fair, reasonable, and fully
known and understood by the client."); Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, 137 A.D.2d 514,
514, 523 N.Y.S.2d 986, 986 (2d Dep't 1988) (fairness and reasonableness standards
applied to valuation of legal fee); J.M. Heinike Assocs. v. Liberty Natl Bank, 142
A.D.2d 929, 930, 530 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356-57 (4th Dep't 1988) (retaining prepaid fee
following withdrawal from representaion in absence of good cause is unconscionable);
see also Lester Brickman & Lawrence A. Cunningham, Nonrefundable Retainers: Im-
permissible Under Fiduciary, Statutory and Contract Law, 57 FoRDHAAi L. Ry. 149
(1988) (asserting that, with few exceptions, nonrefundable retainers are illegal, un-
ethical, and contrary to attorney-client fiduciary obligation, statutes, and principles of
contract law).
4 See Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Comm. Op. 85-120 (1987) (concluding that non-re-
fundable retainer places lawyer on call so that lawyer must forego other employment,
thus, constituting proper factor in compensating lawyer); Texas Bar Op. 391 (1978)
(requiring lawyer to provide client with circumstances where the fee would not be
returned); Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 80-21 (1986) (same);
Alaska Op. 87-1 (1987) (same).
Some bar associations have reacted unfavorably to the use of the non-refimdable
fee agreements. See Cleveland Bar Ass'n Op. 84-1 (1984) (lawyer may not require
nonrefundable retainer to secure availability over specified period of time without re-
gard to specified matter); Michigan Bar Op. CI-962 (1983) (requiring return of
unearned portion of retainer); Nassau County Bar Op. 85-5 (1985) (forbidding lawyer
from entering into fee agreement with client that calls for nonrefundable retainer and
requiring that unearned advance fee payments must be refunded to client upon
discharge).
5 N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFssIoNAL R.spoNsinILITY, Preliminary Statement at
355 (McKinney 1992). The Code sets forth the general principles and standards of
professional conduct and is divided into three parts: Canons, Ethical Considerations,
and Disciplinary Rules. Id. at 354. The Ethical Considerations, aspirational in char-
acter, represent the objectives of the profession and serve as guidance in specific situ-
ations. Id. at 355. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory rules which are considered
the substantive law which subjects all attorneys to disciplinary action. See id.; see also
In re Hof, 102 A.D.2d 591, 596, 478 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (2d Dep't 1984) ("Disciplinary
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nary Rule ("DR") 2-110(A)(3) provides that "a lawyer who with-
draws from employment shall refund promptly any part of a fee
paid in advance which has not been earned,"' while DR 2-106(A)
prohibits an "excessive" fee. Courts, however, have ambiguously
interpreted this language in determining the amount owed to a
lawyer who has been prematurely discharged. 8  The use of
rules and ethical considerations set down in the Code ... represent the acknowledged
standards of the profession....").
6 N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 2-110(A)(3) (McKinney
1992).
7 Id. DR 2-106(A); see Joel R. Brandes, P.C. v. Zingmond, 151 Misc. 2d 671, 573
N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1991) (finding $15,000 nonrefundable fee for
services in divorce action excessive when client reconciled with spouse shortly after
entering into agreement); In re Adoption of E.W.C., 89 Misc. 2d 64, 77, 389 N.Y.S.2d
743, 752 (Sur. Ct. Nassau County 1976) (finding fee not related to lawyer's actual
services clearly excessive and in violation of Code); New York State Bar Ass'n Comm.
on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 599 (1989). To the extent the court finds illegality
based on the disproportion of the fee demanded with the value of the attorney's serv-
ices, the DR 2-106(A) proscription against "excessive fees," as well as EC 2-17 and EC
2-18 governing reasonable fees, make it difficult to distinguish the legal issues from
the ethical ones. Id. Ethically, no fee agreement can ever be literally "non-refundable"
as the term may be understood. Id. Since the determination of whether a fee is
"clearly excessive" involves a factual inquiry into each case, it can be argued that
ethical proscription against "clearly excessive fees" is not compatible with per se rule
banning all nonrefimdable fee agreements. Id.
8 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Sassower, 122 Misc. 2d 863, 474 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 1st Dep't 1983), affd, 107 A.D.2d 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1st Dep't), affid, 66
N.Y.2d 991, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985).
Significant legal issues involving the fiduciary relationship that exists between
an attorney and a client impact the termination of a lawyer's services. Lawyers are
fiduciaries because a client retains an attorney to exercise "professional judgment"
and to act primarily for the client's benefit thus requiring the client to place great
trust and confidence in the lawyer. See ABA, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
smrLrrY EC 5-1, DR 5-105(A) (1992); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETmcs
§ 4.1, at 147 (1986) ("[C]lients have a right to assume that a lawyer who undertakes to
listen to them and to render legal assistance can be trusted.... ."); Charles Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend; The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J.
1060, 1075 (1976) (noting legal profession "exemplifies... the ideal of personal rela-
tions of trust and personal care .... ).
As a matter of law, the client's right to discharge a lawyer is essentially absolute,
and well established legal precedent dictates that a client should not be compelled to
continue being represented by a lawyer in whom the client has lost confidence or
trust. See Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 174, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916). Inherent in the
fiduciary relationship between attorney and client is the right to discharge a lawyer
at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for the lawyer's services. See In
re Dunn, 205 N.Y. 398, 402, 98 N.E. 914, 916 (1912); Petty v. Field, 97 A.D.2d 538,
539, 467 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (2d Dep't 1983); see also Hausen v. Davis, 112 Misc. 2d
992, 994-95, 448 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1981) (allowing dis-
charged attorney who had retainer to prosecute personal injury claim to recover fixed
sum on quantum meruit basis).
1993]
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"nonrefundable" retainers 9 raises two issues: how much of the
nonrefundable fee has been "earned," and whether the lawyer is
charging a fee that is "excessive" within the prohibition of DR 2-
106(A). Recently, in Matter of Cooperman,10 the Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department, held that nonrefundable fee agreements
between attorneys and clients are unethical under all
circumstances. 1
The respondent in Cooperman, attorney Edward Cooperman,
was charged with professional misconduct as a result of his use of
nonrefundable fee agreements in connection with three separate
clients.' 2 One instance involved a fifteen thousand dollar fee
which Cooperman stated was nonrefundable once he filed a notice
of appearance on behalf of the client.13  In a second matter,
9 See 1 STUART M. SPEISER, ATroRNEY FEES §§ 1:12-:21, at 16-25 (1973). The term
general retainer is used in a variety of contexts and must be distinguished from a
special retainer, which is an agreement for the performance of specific legal services
for a designated fee. See id. A general retainer is similar to an option agreement be-
tween the attorney and the client in which the client agrees to pay a fixed sum to the
attorney in exchange for the attorney's promise to be available to perform, at an
agreed price, any legal services that are required during a specific period. Id. The
attorney forms the general retainer by agreeing to be available, not by performing
services. See MORTIMER D. ScWARTZ & RIcHARD C. WYDIcK, PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETH-
ics 100 (2d ed. 1988). In addition, attorneys use the term "retainer" to mean a lump
sum fee paid by a client at the outset of a matter, stating that the fee is "nonrefimd-
able." Id. Other times the fee agreement states that the "retainer" is to cover a speci-
fied amount of work, and if more work is needed the client will pay for it at a specified
rate. Id. Sometimes, the agreement does not specify what is intended. Id. "Finally,
attorneys sometimes use the term 'retainer' to mean an advance payment of fees (spe-
cial retainer) for work that the lawyer will perform in the future." Id. The parties may
limit the range of legal services to be covered by the general retainer or may create a
hybrid general-special retainer by agreeing that part or all of the general retainer be
applied to the bill for any services actually performed. See James C. Freund, Skadden
Arps in 40th Year-A Memoir of'Flom Machine', N.Y. L.J., June 18, 1987, at 1, col. 3.
10 187 A D.2d 56, 591 N.Y.S.2d 855 (2d Dep't 1993).
11 Id. at 57, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856.
12 Id. at 57-58, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The disciplinary proceeding against Mr.
Cooperman was initiated by complaints filed with the Grievance Committee for the
Tenth Judicial District in the Spring of 1991. Id. at 56. In October, the Committee
brought 15 charges of professional misconduct against Cooperman in connection with
three clients. See Shirley E. Perlman, Panel Bans Non-refundable Lawyers' Fees,
NEWSDAY (Nassau Ed.), Jan. 29, 1993, at 33. He had ignored two letters of caution
issued by the Committee in 1985 and 1987. Id.
The Special Referee sustained all 15 charges. Cooperman, 187 A-D.2d at 57-58,
591 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The Appellate Division reversed as to three charges and allowed
the other 12 to stand. Id. at 62, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 859. As a result, Cooperman was
suspended from the practice of law for two years. Id.
13 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 58, 591 N.Y.S. 2d at 856. Charges two through five
related to the fees "earned" by filing a notice of appearance on the clients' behalf. Id.
The relevant provision of Cooperman's retainer agreement stated: "My minimum fee
696
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Cooperman refused to refund a five thousand dollar retainer even
though he was discharged just forty-eight hours after being
hired.14 The clients claimed that the language in the fee agree-
ments violated the attorney's obligation under the Code to
promptly refund any unearned portion of a fee paid in advance' 5
and interfered with their absolute right to discharge an attorney
at any time.' Furthermore, they alleged that in each of the fee
agreements Cooperman charged clearly excessive fees.' The five-
for appearing for you in this matter is fifteen thousand ($15,000) dollars. This fee is
not refundable for any reason whatsoever once I file a notice of appearance on your
behalf." Id.
14 Id. at 58, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856-57. Charges 7 through 10 referred to an agree-
ment which provided:
For a MINIMUM FEE and NON-REFUNDABLE amount of Five Thousand
($5,000) Dollars, I will act as your counsel.... This is the minimum fee no
matter how much or how little work I do in this investigatory stage... and
will remain the minimum fee and not refundable even if you decide prior to
my completion of the investigation that you wish to discontinue the use of
my services for any reason whatsoever.
Id.
15 Id. at 59,591 N.Y.S.2d at 857; see N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSI-
Bmrry, DR 2-110(A)(3) (McKinney 1992) (providing that lawyer who withdraws from
employment "shall refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not
been earned"). An attorney employed under a contract for a specific fee, who is dis-
charged without cause, is relegated to recovery on quantum meruit for the services
rendered prior to discharge. See Jacobson v. Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 993, 489
N.E.2d 1283, 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1985); see also Ventola v. Ventola, 112
A.D.2d 291, 292, 491 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (2d Dep't 1985) (holding that even under
"fixed-fee retainer" agreement, amount of attorney's compensation for services ren-
dered prior to discharge must be determined on quantum meruit basis).
16 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857; see supra note 8 (discussing
client's right to discharge attorney). The current doctrine defining the freedom to dis-
charge an attorney was established in Martin v. Camp. 219 N.Y. 170, 114 N.E. 46
(1916). While a client may discharge his attorney without cause at any time, the
discharged attorney is ordinarily entitled to recover in quantum meruit for the fair
and reasonable value of his services up to the point of discharge. See Jacobson v.
Sassower, 66 N.Y.2d 991, 992, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (1983);
In re Goldin, 104 A.D.2d 890, 891, 480 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (2d Dep't 1984); N.Y.S.B.A.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsirnxry, DR 2-106 (McKinney 1992). Other jurisdic-
tions have similarly concluded that a discharged attorney is entitled to recover in
quantum meruit. See, e.g., Buckelew v. Grossbard, 461 A.2d 590, 592 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1983), affd, 469 A.2d 518 (1983); Belli v. Shaw, 657 P.2d 315, 319 (Wash.
1983). Other courts have held that if a client proves good cause for discharge, the
attorney is not entitled to recover under the contract of employment, but may recover
for services rendered up to the time of discharge. See, e.g., Rocha v. Ahmad, 676
S.W.2d 149, 156 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984). New York has gone even farther and held that
an attorney discharged for just cause loses all right to compensation. See Kyle v.
Kyle, 94 A.D.2d 866, 866, 463 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (3d Dep't 1983).
17 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857; see supra notes 13 and 14.
The Code contains basic requirements that are applicable to all fee arrangements be-
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judge panel unanimously concluded that nonrefundable fee agree-
ments are against public policy and therefore void."8 The court
explained that "[slince an attorney's fee is never truly nonrefund-
able until it is earned, the use of [the term nonrefundable] ... is
misleading, interferes with a client's right to discharge an attor-
ney, and attempts to limit an attorney's duty to refund promptly,
upon discharge, all those fees not yet earned."' 9 The court cited
DR 2-110(A)(3) to support its conclusion that a discharged law-
yer's fee should be measured in quantum meruit.20 Furthermore,
the court found the phrase "nonrefundable fee" to be "imbued with
an absoluteness which conflicts with DR 2-110(A)(3)," 2" which pro-
vides that any unearned portion of a fee must be returned.22 Ac-
knowledging the "peculiar and distinctive" nature of the attorney-
client employment contract and its difference from ordinary em-
ployment contracts, the court found the use of nonrefundable re-
tainer agreements to be unethical and unconscionable.23
tween a lawyer and a client. See, e.g., N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PRoFEssioNA. RESPONSIBI-
rry, EC 2-17 (McKinney 1992) ('The determination of a proper fee requires considera-
tion of the interests of both client and lawyer. A lawyer should not charge more than a
reasonable fee .... ."); see also id. DR 2-106(A) (providing that "[a] lawyer shall not
enter into an agreement for, charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee").
18 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
19 Id. at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857. "We find the use of these retainer agreements to
be unethical and unconscionable in spite of the inherent right of attorneys to enter
into contracts for their services." Id. (citing Greenberg v. Remick & Co., 230 N.Y. 70,
129 N.E. 211 (1920)). Arguably, nonrefundable retainers could be justified pursuant
to section 474 of New York's Judicial Code. See N.Y. JuD. LAw § 474 (McKinney 1983)
(attorney compensation is "governed by agreement, express or implied, which is not
restrained by law .... ."). But see Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 3, at 170
(maintaining that "[lliteral interpretation of the statutory language ... is inconsistent
with judicial doctrine treating the attorney-cient contract as an aspect of fiduciary
law"). "Moreover, the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility by the
Appellate Divisions of New York's court system... would have been precluded since
several sections regulate the inception of the attorney-client relationship and the fees
to be charged." Id. at 170-71 n.139 (citations omitted).
20 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857; see supra note 15.
21 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
22 N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmiLrrY, DR 2-110 (A)(3) (McKinney
1992). The court found that a client who signed a nonrefundable fee agreement might
mistakenly conclude that even the part of the fee that exceeded quantum meruit could
not be returned. See Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 59, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857. Additionally,
the court decided that the language used was against public policy because it would
create an "impermissible chilling effect upon the client's inherent right... to dis-
charge an attorney at any time with or without cause." Id.
23 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 60, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 857; see Martin, 219 N.Y. at 174,
114 N.E. at 48 ("The discharge of the attorney by his client does not constitute a
breach of the contract, because it is a term of such contract, implied from the peculiar
relationship which the contract calls into existence, that the client may terminate the
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
In explaining its ruling, the Cooperman court distinguished
nonrefundable fees from "minimum fee agreements," which serve
as useful forecasts of the amount a client can expect to pay for a
specific lawyer's services.2 4 The court praised minimum fee agree-
ments as a means for comparing lawyers fees for similar serv-
ices.25 In setting minimum fees, a lawyer may consider several
factors enumerated in DR 2-106(B), including the time and labor
involved, the effect that accepting the matter may have on the
lawyer's ability to enter into other employment, the results ob-
tained, time limitations imposed, and the lawyer's experience and
reputation.26 In examining the reasonableness of Cooperman's
fees, the court applied these standards and found the fees in each
contract at any time with or without cause."); see also Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein
v. Glantz, 53 N.Y.2d 553, 556,428 N.E.2d 387, 389, 444 N.Y.S.2d 55, 57 (1981) (noting
that "a client may at anytime, with or without cause, discharge an attorney ....").
24 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 57, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856. The court found that there
was a valid distinction to be made between nonrefundable fee agreements and mini-
mum fee agreements. Id. In doing so, it declined to follow other opinions that "blur"
this valid distinction. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 599
(1989) (using terms "nonrefundable" and "minimum fees" interchangeably). The court
stated that nonrefundable fee agreements, by definition, allow an attorney to keep an
advance payment even if the attorney had not earned the fee. Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d
at 57, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 856. In contrast, the minimum fee agreement is the minimum
amount that a client can expect to pay a specific attorney for his representation in the
matter until its completion. Id.
25 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 57, 59, N.Y.S.2d at 856.
26 See N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmnrry, DR 2-106(A) (McKin-
ney 1992). DR 2-106(B) provides:
A fee is excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary
prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in
excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining
the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
1. The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
2. The likelihood, if apparent or made known to the client, that the accept-
ance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by
the lawyer.
3. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
4. The amount involved and the results obtained.
5. The time limitations imposed by the client or by circumstances.
6. The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
7. The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers perform-
ing the services.
8. Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Id. DR 2-106(B). According to the New York State Bar Committee, the standard set
forth in DR 2-106(B) is highly fact specific. See N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Op. 1991-1993 (1989).
19931
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case to be excessive, and thus in violation of the Code.2 7 Specifi-
cally, the court noted that the agreements offered no protection for
the clients if they wished to terminate the attorney's services
within hours after retention, as the forfeiture of a large sum of
money would result.28
The Cooperman decision represents the first occasion on
which an Appellate Division in New York has employed DR 2-
110(A)(3) to invalidate the use of nonrefundable fee agreements.29
Rather than deciding the case on the narrower ground of a "clearly
excessive fee[ ]," the court ruled broadly in banning the use of
nonrefundable fee agreements.3 0 It is submitted that the court
erred in categorically prohibiting the use of nonrefundable fee
agreements, instead of permitting the reasonableness of these
agreements to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, in accordance
with the factors contemplated by DR 2-106(B).
It is also suggested that disqualification of an attorney or law
firm is an important factor in determining the reasonableness of a
nonrefundable fee. For instance, a "true general retainer" serves
the purpose of obligating an attorney to be available to represent a
particular client, as well as preventing that attorney from taking
27 Cooperman, 187 A.D.2d at 61, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 858-59. Based on evidence ad-
duced at the hearing, the court sustained charges that the respondent's fees were
excessive and that he wrongfully refused to refund the unearned portions of the fees.
Id. at 61, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 859. Cooperman argued that his fee did not reflect a quan-
tum meruit calculation according to his hourly rates, but in all the cases the fee re-
flected permissible factors explicitly allowed by the Code. Id. at 61, 591 N.Y.S.2d at
858. The court acknowledged that the factors of DR 2-106(B) were considered before
reaching their conclusion. Id. at 61, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
28 Id. at 60, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 858. Cooperman admitted that he used the retainer
agreements to prevent his clients from exercising their right to fire him. Id. at 61, 591
N.Y.S.2d at 858. Courts have concluded that some fee agreements which result in the
forfeiture of large sums before prospective services are rendered impose a substantial
penalty on the client. See Gross v. Russo, 76 Misc. 2d 441, 444, 351 N.Y.S.2d 355, 359
(Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1974) (ruling that $25,000 liquidated damage fee upon
termination is unconscionable as matter of law), rev'd, 47 A.D.2d 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d
184 (2d Dep't 1975); see also Brickman & Cunningham, supra note 3, at 189-90 (ana-
lyzing of nonrefundable retainers on basis of traditional contract law).
29 Stephen Gillers, All Non-Refundable Fee Agreements are not Created Equal,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 1993, at 1, col. 1. Gillers, a New York University professor and expert
on legal ethics, notes that this is the first such ruling in New York and perhaps any-
where. Id. He maintains that the court erred in banning all nonrefundable fee agree-
ments. Id. at 2, col. 1. Gillers concludes that each case should be decided on its facts,
remarking that "we must use a rule of reason, not a categorical prohibition. . . ." Id. at
3, col. 4.
30 Id. at 1, col. 1.
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a fee from a party with adverse interests."' In the market place,
clients often retain legal experts to prevent adversaries from do-
ing so.3 2 The conflict of interest rules, DR 5-105(A) and DR 5-108,
prevent attorneys and their firms from representing clients in
"substantially related" matters in which that client's interests are
"materially adverse" to a former client.3 3 It is asserted that the
court failed to consider that lawyers sell their future employability
in accepting nonrefundable fee agreements. Therefore, a lawyer's
fee accounts not only for the work performed on a particular case,
but also for other work that the lawyer is forced to forego.
In addition, many clients, as well as attorneys, recognize the
value of hiring an experienced attorney with an excellent reputa-
tion. 4 When a party has retained a prestigious lawyer, opposing
31 See id. at 2, col. 2; N.Y.S.B-.A Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 1991-
1993 (1989). A "retainer" is an amount paid for reserving the availability of the law-
yer, generally with respect to a particular period of time. Id. The retainer may also
provide that the lawyer be on call to represent a specific client in connection with a
particular matter, if the client decides to use the lawyer. Id. In the latter case, the
retainer agreement may implicitly contemplate that the lawyer could not represent
anyone else in connection with the event or transaction where such representation
could interfere, by reason of conflict of interest, with the representation of the client
who is reserving the services of the lawyer. Id. Where the retainer is for a specified
period of time, it is generally contemplated that the lawyer will limit his or her other
commitments so as to be available for the client paying the retainer. Id. Fees for ac-
tual legal services performed might be credited against the retainer (resembling a
minimum fee) or they might be billed in addition to the retainer. See SPEISER, supra
note 9, § 1:1, at 3-6 (providing that retainer is for availability and lost opportunity
cost as well as services actually rendered).
32 See JAZES STEWART, THE PARTNERS 255 (1983); Wilson, Managing for Success
at Skadden Arps, INL FIN. L. REV. 31 (1984). Skadden's typical retainer agreements
provide that the firm will represent its client to prevent a hostile takeover, even if the
corporate raider is also a client. Id. Thus, the firm cannot represent the raider-clients
in takeover efforts against target-clients. Id.
33 N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsmImrm, DR 5-108 (McKinney
1992). Once a lawyer identifies a potential conflict of interest between two clients, he
must withdraw from representing both. Id. In addition, the disqualification from rep-
resenting adverse interests is to the firm as a whole. See id. DR 5-105(D). See gener-
ally Orrin G. Judd, Conflicts of Interest-A Trial Judge's Notes, 44 FoRDHAm L. REV.
1097 (1976) (outlining judiciary's role in "safeguarding the client's interest in effec-
tive, independent representation").
34 See MARK STEVENS, POWER OF ATroRNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRMs
104 (1987) ("[C]lients [of Skaden Arps' M & A practice] pay annual retainers... just
[as] an insurance policy making it certain that the miracle worker and his squadron of
highly trained shock troops will be available at the first sign of takeover."). The au-
thor notes the power and experience of particular law firms and the effect of their
reputation in the business community. Id. at 101-27. With respect to the merger-ac-
quisition-takeover practice at Skadden, Arps, it may command "incredible fees" be-
cause they have the ability to do the job and the "business community believes it can
do it better than anyone else." Id. at 103.
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counsel and clients are often willing to settle a case more quickly
and, in some circumstances, may even be dissuaded from initiat-
ing a lawsuit." Thus, it is asserted that a nonrefundable fee can
clearly be considered "earned when paid."3 6
Furthermore, the client's level of sophistication and the na-
ture and complexity of the legal task should also be considered by
the court in determining the validity of a nonrefundable re-
tainer. 7 For instance, a major corporation with inside general
counsel justifiably may not consider a large retainer fee to be un-
conscionable when it seeks the best possible counsel to work on a
difficult case.3 In addition, prior to determining the validity of a
fee agreement, the court should look to the expectations of the
party and conduct a full exploration of the facts and
circumstances.3 9
35 Id. at 101-27.
36 See PROPOSED CALIFORNIA RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT 3-700(D)(2) (1987)
(defining "true retainer fee" as one "paid solely for the purpose of insuring the availa-
bility of the attorney for the matter"); see also Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 85-
20 (1985) (such "retainer" belongs to the lawyer when it is paid, and it should not be
put into the client trust account); Texas State Bar Op. 431 (1986) (same); Wisconsin
State Bar Formal Op. E-86-9 (1986) (same).
37 See N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 599; supra note 26. While the
bar recognizes the potential for abuse of nonrefundable fee agreements involving cli-
ents of limited education and experience, the bar does not consider "retainer" agree-
ments per se violative of professional ethics Id. If retention of the fee is expressly
conditioned on the absence of lawyer default and the client is fully advised that the
fee can be "earned" on grounds other than hours of service, the amount is not exces-
sive. Id. Factors enumerated in DR 2-106(B) implicitly call for the assumption that
fees are earned on other grounds. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
38 See Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir.)
(ruling that one million dollar minimum contingent fee not unconscionable when
large corporation of superior bargaining strength sought best possible outside coun-
sel), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
39 See Cohen v. Ryan, 34 A.D.2d 789, 790, 311 N.Y.S.2d 644, 645 (2d Dep't 1970)
(stating that retainer agreement will not be enforced in absence of proof that it was
fully comprehended by client).
Whether enforcement of such a retainer should be denied as unconscionable
or as having a chilling effect on a client's right to freely discharge his attor-
ney should depend on a "full exploration of all the facts and circumstances
[of the particular case], including the intent of the parties and whether the
fee demanded is out of proportion to the value of the attorney's services."
Jacobson, 107 A.D.2d at 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 712 (quoting Gross v. Russo, 47 A.D.2d
655, 655, 364 N.Y.S.2d 184, 186 (2d Dep't 1975)) (alteration in original). It is sug-
gested that the amount of the fee determined to be "earned" should depend upon the
express terms of the fee agreement, the parties' expectations at the time of signing the
contract as well as the extent to which the lawyer satisfied the client's legitimate
expectations, and the benefits received by the client. See N.Y.S.B.A. Comm. on Profes-
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
In an earlier case, Jacobson v. Sassower,40 the New York
Court of Appeals found a general retainer agreement ambiguous,
and thus, upon discharge, the attorney was to be compensated on
an hourly basis, rather than keeping the retainer. 41 However, the
court, in dictum, concluded that, although such retainers are not
to be encouraged, not all are unenforceable as a matter of law.42
In deciding the question left open in the Jacobson opinion, it is
submitted that the Cooperman court failed to distinguish certain
circumstances in which the general retainer may serve valid pro-
fessional and economic interests.
Consequently, in light of the widespread use of the non-
refundable general retainer throughout the New York metropoli-
tan area,43 the ruling of the Cooperman court is likely to have a
large impact on the manner in which attorneys bill their clients.
New York attorneys practicing in the Second Department should
be aware that despite their common use, nonrefundable fee agree-
ments will be considered invalid.
Christina M. Follini
sional Ethics Op. 599 (l'he essence of the matter is clarity-clarity that will assure the
client's full understanding of the fee agreement proposal.").
40 66 N.Y.2d 991, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 499 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1985).
41 Id. at 992, 489 N.E.2d at 1284, 499 N.Y.S.2d at 382. In Jacobson, an attorney
sought to convert a special retainer into a general retainer, and thus to preclude a
refund. See Jacobson v. Sassower, 113 Misc. 2d 279, 281, 452 N.Y.S.2d 981, 982
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1982). The trial court held that the agreement failed to
establish a general retainer fitting into the Martin exception. Id. at 283, 452 N.Y.S.2d
at 984; see Martin v. Camp, 219 N.Y. 170, 176, 114 N.E. 46, 48 (1916) (stating in
dictum that rule forbidding contract damages upon dismissal of attorney without
cause was inapplicable to general retainers on basis of sacrifice of availability). The
Appellate Division affirmed and adopted the Gross position, observing that the re-
tainer's enforceability "should depend on 'full exploration of the facts and circum-
stances'" including the intentions of the parties. Jacobson v. Sassower, 107 A.D.2d
603, 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d 711, 712 (1st Dep't 1985).
42 Jacobson, 107 A.D.2d at 603, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
43 See Jacobson, 113 Misc. 2d at 285, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see, e.g., John H.
L'Estrange, Jr. & William J. Tucker, Fee Agreements, 27 PRAc. LAw. 11 (April 1981).
STVENS, supra note 34, at 101-27 (discussing NYC firm Skadden Arps' retainer fees).
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